The strengthening of the position of courts was, to a large extent, the result of the creation and rapid development of constitutional justice. It has made the power that was “in some measure, next to nothing” a real power, and the apolitical placement of courts changed into a political one, or at least one leading to serious political repercussions.… There is no doubt today that courts are a branch of power in the full sense of the word, and some even point out that because of constitutional justice they have become de facto the first power. From the position of a passive power, they have changed their placement, mainly owing to constitutional justice, to that of an active power, which competes on a par with the authority of the parliament and government in search of a golden mean of political balance. As a consequence, constitutional courts have slowly, but very consistently, forged their position by stepping into the shoes of a power that is as a matter of fact a political and active one. This, apart from prestige and recognition for constitutional courts, has also created the threat that, like with all the other active branches of power, they would become a participant in disputes and polemics, and could enter into a classic power conflict….
Political disputes over the Constitutional Court cannot be eliminated altogether. The Court, by its very nature, may betray political engagement, or at least its judicial decisions will have a political effect, which means that it will be engaged in the political optics of rivalry between the separated branches of power. The constitutional drafters, acting rationally, should therefore exercise due care to eliminate possible tensions. Political disputes cannot be predicted, nor can they be eliminated. However, they can be mitigated, and unfortunately this is still missing in the Polish Constitutional Court model.
FROM THE INTRODUCTION